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AbstrAct
The advances of artificial intelligence (AI) have renewed the interest in the mind-body problem, the 
ancient philosophical debate on the nature of mind and its relationship with the brain. The new version 
of the mind-body problem concerns the relationship between computational complexity and self-aware 
thought. The traditional controversy between strong and weak AI will not be settled until we are able 
in the future to build a robot so evolved to give us the possibility to verify its perceptions, its qualitative 
sensations, and its introspective thoughts. However, an alternative way can be followed: The progresses 
of micro-, nano-, and biotechnologies allow us to create the first bionic creatures, composed of biologi-
cal cells connected to electronic devices. Creating an artificial brain with a biological structure could 
allow verifying if it possesses peculiar properties with respect to an electronic one, comparing them at 
the same level of complexity.
INtrODUctION
The attempt to understand the nature of mind 
goes back to the time of the Greek philosophers. 
In modern times, the behavioral movement con-
centrated on the external behavior, excluding the 
importance of the internal mental processes. Only 
in the last decades the cognitive sciences and the 
artificial intelligence (AI) research attracted atten-
tion on mental processes, reviving the interest in 
the nature of intelligence and reflexive thought.
The development of computer technology 
opened a new research method by means of 
computer simulations of functions typical of the 
human brain. 
After the enthusiasm of the first times, when 
many prototypes were developed, the successes of 
AI research faded in the ’80s due to the difficulty 
to move the AI algorithms in the complexity of 
the real world. 
However, although the wide, excessively 
expensive and ambitious AI systems that con-
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centrated on specific problems were once re-
nounced, in the last decade, swift developments 
have produced many applications in robotics and 
several useful algorithms applied to all kinds of 
fields, where the complexity of the problems is 
greater and traditional algorithms cannot reach 
significant results.
Nonetheless, the solutions proposed for the 
problem of the nature of mind remain debat-
able.
The development of AI created a diatribe be-
tween the supporters of the so-called strong and 
weak AI. Following weak AI, the computer is just 
a powerful tool that allows us to verify hypotheses 
and to implement useful functionalities, but it will 
never have the features of a human mind.
Following strong AI, the computer can be 
considered a real mind that in the future, endowed 
with evolved programs, will possess all the fea-
tures of the mind and cognitive states.
This unsolved diatribe changed over time into 
a dispute between materialists and nonmaterial-
ists. The purpose is not anymore to decide if the 
technology will succeed in developing robots 
with an intelligence similar to the human one 
(we understood that this is a very far goal but 
that we will reach it for all practical purposes), 
but to understand the very nature of mind and its 
relationship with the brain.
This problem is seen today not only as a 
philosophical but also as a scientific goal, whose 
application to AI development will be an impor-
tant consequence.
bAcKGrOUND
Weak AI vs. strong AI
One of the most famous and sharp criticisms of 
strong AI is John Searle’s work (1980) and its 
“Chinese room” thought experiment. An English 
man is closed in a room. He does not understand 
Chinese. He receives a sheet containing a story 
and some questions on the story written in Chi-
nese, and a set of rules to draw Chinese symbols 
in reply to the questions. The man follows the 
rules and answers the questions.
The rules correspond to a computer program. 
The man corresponds to a computer that processes 
the program specified by means of formal rules. 
The man can become so clever that his answers are 
indistinguishable from those of a Chinese man.
Strong AI maintains that the computer under-
stands the story, but the man in the room does not 
understand the story at all. He does not know the 
meaning of the Chinese symbols. Many objections 
have been raised by Searle’s conclusion about this 
thought experiment, and Searle always rejected 
them with extremely smart considerations. 
However, it is clear that the English man ac-
complishes in the room only a careful but stupid 
copying task from a lookup table and does not 
perform a learning algorithm such as those AI 
(and all the more reason for the human mind) is 
able to accomplish.
The man in the room could try to understand 
the connection between the lookup table items and 
the story, and finally he could learn Chinese. The 
same could be accomplished by a machine using, 
for example, an artificial neural network or other 
symbolic knowledge representation techniques. 
Thus, it seems that the progresses of AI succeed 
without difficulties in giving a computer the ability 
to understand the connections between informa-
tion, and to memorize and learn them.
Douglas Hofstadter (1979; see also Hofstadter 
& Dennett, 1981), one of the most convincing and 
famous strong-AI supporters, maintains that a 
growing complexity of the computer processes, 
including the interaction between different cogni-
tive levels, could lead a machine not only to the 
ability of understanding and learning, but also to 
the emergence of the ability of self-reflection that 
is the basis of consciousness.
Hofstadter hypothesizes that consciousness 
rises from the closure of a tangled loop between 
the high (symbolic) level and low (neurophysi-
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ological) level, bounded to each other by a chain 
of causalities. The most central and complex 
symbol of the high level is the one we call I. This 
closed loop allows the representational system to 
perceive its own state inside a set of concepts.
Currently, many AI programs already pos-
sess the ability to know their own structures and 
react to variations of these structures, exhibiting 
a rudimental kind of control of the self. In con-
clusion, Hofstadter affirms that the mind can be 
reproduced inside a computer because it can be 
simulated by a program, thus it does not reside 
in the biological structure of the brain.
the “Hard Problem”
The above considerations seem to lead to the as-
sertion that a computer could in the future pres-
ent all the features of a human mind, including 
consciousness. However, the problem is not so 
easily solved.
Following David Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995, 
1997), to be able to develop an intelligent machine 
that is aware, understands, learns, and possesses 
a control of its own self as a human being does is 
not equivalent to state that this machine possesses 
a mind in the subjective and qualitative sense that 
we experience.
He coined the term “hard problem” to indi-
cate the problem to understand the origin of the 
subjective and qualitative component of the mind 
experience differently from “easy problems,” 
that is, the problems that concern the integration 
between internal mental states and sensorial 
perceptions, selective attention, emotional be-
havior, and so forth. These problems should in 
principle be solved in the future by means of the 
neurophysiological research and the computer 
science approach.
In the future, a computer could also be able 
to reproduce faithfully the human thought in a 
third-person fashion, but nothing indicates that 
the computer would have a first-person experience 
of what it is elaborating.
As an example, Minsky’s emotion machine 
(Minsky, 2006) could soon reproduce many typi-
cally human functionalities, like emotions and 
the idea of self, but there is no reason to think 
that the computer would experience emotions 
and the sense of self in the same subjective way 
as we do.
The hard problem is not a problem about how 
functions are performed, but the problem to un-
derstand why the performance of the functions 
is associated with conscious experience.
We are not able to explain why, for instance, 
when the brain processes a specific wavelength of 
light, we have the experience of a specific color 
(the “blueness” of blue). 
consciousness and Laws of Nature
Chalmers does not deny that the biological struc-
ture of the brain is heavily implied in the onset of 
the phenomenon of consciousness, but he affirms 
that the connection between conscious processes 
and their neural correlates are not obvious. How-
ever, both Chalmers and Searle (1980) believe that 
the difference between man and machine could 
be connected with the specific properties of the 
brain physiology. The exact reproduction of the 
neural physiology, even with a different chemis-
try, could lead to reproduce also the experiential 
properties of consciousness.
Another way to face the problem, as Chalmers 
suggests, is to admit that consciousness is an ir-
reducible phenomenon, that is, an a priori property 
of nature. In this way, consciousness would obey 
laws similar to the other fundamental physical 
laws like gravity or electromagnetism. 
The key observation is that not all the entities 
in science are explained in terms of more primitive 
physical entities. For instance, space-time, mass, 
and charge are considered fundamental entities 
of the universe because they are not reducible to 
something easier.
In the case of consciousness, the goal would 
be to affirm that the brain state B produces the 
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conscious state C due to the fundamental law X. 
We could come to a theory of everything that 
includes the laws of consciousness inside the set 
of the laws of nature.
A possibility to include consciousness in the 
laws of nature has been opened by quantum me-
chanics, in whose fundamentals the role of the 
observer is extremely critical. Several idealistic 
or interactionist theories are still competing 
with the traditional Copenhagen interpretation: 
Erwin Schrödinger (1956) first approached the 
Oriental monism in the frame of quantum me-
chanics, putting the accent of the indissolubility 
between the physical event and observer’s mind. 
After him, J. Archibald Wheeler (1983), Eugene 
Wigner (1961, 1972), and in more recent times 
Josephson and Pallikari-Viras (1991) and Henry 
Stapp (1993) maintained quantum theories where 
consciousness is crucial in the objectivity of 
physical reality.
In particular, Stapp (1993) proposes an inter-
pretation where consciousness, intended as an 
a priori phenomenon, is the cause of the wave 
function collapse. On the other hand, Chalmers’ 
hypothesis is that a way to include consciousness 
in the frame of the laws of nature is to develop 
a theory of everything based on the concept of 
information, hypothesizing that information has 
two aspects: a physical one and an experiential 
one. Systems with equal structural organization 
include equal information. This idea is compatible 
with Wheeler’s (1983) theory that information is 
a fundamental concept of physics. The laws of 
physics could be re-coined in informational terms, 
satisfying the congruence between physical and 
psychophysical structures.
Although the role of the observer in quantum 
mechanics remains an extremely controversial 
issue, in the last few years several quantum mind 
theories have been developed (Hagan, Hameroff, 
& Tuszynski, 2002; Matsuno, 1999; Tuszynski, 
Trpisova, Sept, & Sataric, 1997) that intend to 
connect the biophysical properties of the brain to 
quantum physics. The most authoritative is the 
Penrose-Hameroff theory (Hameroff & Penrose, 
1996; Penrose, 1994), which hypothesizes that 
in microtubules, cellular structures inside the 
neuron, quantum reductions take place associated 
with simple consciousness events. Microtubules 
possess the physical properties suitable to obey 
quantum laws, thus they could play a fundamental 
role in the phenomenon of consciousness.
tHE MIND-bODY PrObLEM IN tHE 
21st cENtUrY
Both the hypothesis that intelligence and self-
awareness could spring from the complexity of 
the brain, or an artificial structure perfectly ho-
mologous to the brain, and the parallel hypothesis 
that consciousness is an a priori entity of nature 
and could be connected to the fundamentals of 
quantum physics are at the moment indemon-
strable. However, thanks to the progresses of 
electronics and of computer technology, we can 
start to build the bases of an empirical proof of 
these theories. 
During the past decade, several laboratories 
in the world carried out experiments on direct 
interfacing between electronics and biological 
neurons in order to support neurophysiological 
research, but also to pioneer future hybrid hu-
man-electronic devices, bionic robotics, biological 
computation, and bioelectronic prostheses (Akin, 
Najafi, Smoke, & Bradley, 1994; Canepari, Bove, 
Mueda, Cappello, & Kawana, 1997; Egert et al., 
2002; Maher, Pine, Wright, & Tai, 1999; Potter, 
2001). Progress in this research field is quick and 
continuous.
During the early ’90s, Fromherz’s group (Max 
Planck Institute of Biochemistry) first pioneered 
the silicon-neuron interface. The group keeps 
developing sophisticated techniques to optimize 
this kind of junction (Fromherz, 2002; Fromherz, 
Muller, & Weis, 1993; Fromherz, Offenhäusser, 
Vetter, & Weis, 1991; Fromherz & Schaden, 
1994).
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Many other experiments have been carried out 
with different aims: Garcia, Calabrese, DeWeerth, 
and Ditto (2003) and Lindner and Ditto (1996) at 
Georgia Tech tried to obtain simple computations 
from a hybrid electronic leech creature. As the 
neurons do not behave as “on-off” elements, it has 
been necessary to send them signals and interpret 
the neural output using the chaos theory.
In 2000, a team of the Northwestern University 
of Chicago, University of Illinois, and University 
of Genoa (Reger, Fleming, Sanguineti, Alford, 
& Mussa-Ivaldi, 2000) developed a hybrid crea-
ture consisting of lamprey neurons connected 
to a robot. In front of light stimuli, the creature 
behaves in different ways: follows light, avoids 
it, and moves in circle. 
In 2002, De Marse, Wagenaar, and Potter at 
Georgia Tech created a hybrid creature made of 
a few thousand living neurons from a rat cortex 
placed on a special glass Petri dish instrumented 
with an array of 60 microelectrodes, also able to 
learn from its environment.
In 2003, Duke University’s group (Carmena 
et al., 2003) succeeded in connecting 320 micro-
electrodes to monkey cells in the brain, allowing 
them to directly translate the electrical signals into 
computer instructions and to move a robotic arm. 
In 2005, the SISSA group (Ruaro, Bonifazi, & 
Torre, 2005) experimented with the possibility to 
use neurons on MEAs (microelectrode arrays) as 
“neurocomputers” able to filter digital images.
Despite these astonishing results, neurophysi-
ological research is far from understanding in 
detail the learning mechanism of the brain and 
fails to interpret the cognitive meaning of the 
signals coming from the neurons. 
Our group, the Living Networks Lab, since 
2002 has carried out experiments on networks 
of biological human neurons directly connected 
to MEAs (Figure 1). 
A bionic brain
The neurons, adhering directly to an MEA sup-
port, are stimulated by means of simulated percep-
tions in the form of digital patterns, and the output 
signals are analyzed. In previous experiments, 
we verified that the neurons reply selectively to 
different patterns and show similar reactions in 
front of the presentation of identical or similar 
patterns (Pizzi, Fantasia, Gelain, Rossetti, & 
Vescovi, 2004a; Pizzi, 2006). 
On the basis of these results, we developed a 
bionic creature able to decode the signals coming 
Figure 1. MEA support and magnification of neural stem cells adhering on the MEA
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from a network of neurons stimulated by digital 
patterns. The whole hybrid system is shown in 
Figure 2.
We arranged on the MEA eight input channels 
picked from eight electrodes, on which living 
cells were attached. The cells were cultured on 
the connection sites of the MEA and were con-
nected to each other as in the case of a Hopfield 
(1980) artificial neural network.
The first phase of the experiment consisted of 
stimulating the neurons with a set of simulated 
perceptions in the form of four digital patterns 
(Figure 3).
Figure 2. Block diagram of the hardware
Figure 3. The four patterns: forward, backward, left, right
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The stimulation occurs with a 100 mV positive 
voltage followed by a brief -100 mV depolariza-
tion pulse. The stimulation frequency is 433 Hz, 
and the sampling rate is 10 kHz.
Each pattern is constituted by a matrix of 
8x8 bits. Every bit lasts 300 ms. The cells are 
stimulated 2.4 seconds for each pattern. Each 
stimulation is followed by a 1-second pause and 
is repeated 10 times for each pattern in order to 
allow the neurons to learn.
Once the training phase was finished, a testing 
phase was carried out. During this phase, we sent 
to the neurons several stimulations corresponding 
to one of the four patterns in a random order.
The reactions of the neurons have been sent 
to an artificial neural network that classified 
the answers on the basis of the neural reactions 
recorded after the training phase. The model of 
the artificial neural network, a novel architecture 
called ITSOM (Inductive Tracing Self Organiz-
ing Map; Pizzi, de Curtis, & Dickson, 2002), 
was developed considering that a self-organizing 
architecture was necessary as we had no set of 
known outputs to train with.
In the described experiment, we tested the 
hybrid system with 25 random patterns. The evalu-
ation of the proposed model presents an accuracy 
of 80.11% and a precision of 90.50%. These results 
(Table 1) allow us to consider the effectiveness of 
our hybrid classifier quite satisfactorily.
This research shows a way to deeply analyze 
the behavior of networks of neurons and to decode 
their signals in reply to simulated perceptions. 
After an adequate increase of the number of 
electrode connections, the system should be able 
to receive real perceptions from suitable sensors 
and to react to them. 
Our challenge consists of studying in detail the 
behavior of networks of neurons and of verifying 
if this bionic system, after a suitable increase 
of complexity, will allow the emergence of be-
haviors typical of a human mind in an artificial 
structure with features homologous to the brain 
structure.
Possible Quantum Processes in 
cultured Neurons
Another research line of our group concerns the 
search for possible quantum processes inside the 
neurons. Our system is constituted by networks 
of human neural stem cells cultured on a set of 
MEAs. We verified that weak electromagnetic 
stimulations are able to produce action potentials 
in networks of neurons under extremely strict 
conditions of optical and electrical shielding. 
The first results showed very high values of 
cross-correlation and frequency coherence during 
electromagnetic pulses (Pizzi, Fantasia, Gelain, 
Rossetti, & Vescovi, 2004b); these results encour-
aged us to continue the experimentations. 
During the last 3 years, we prepared and car-
ried out several other experiments, improving both 
the hardware detection and controlling system 
and the shielding techniques. We also took the 
maximum care in preparing the experimental 
Table 1. Performance of the hybrid classifier
     Pattern F Pattern B Pattern L Pattern R Total
Sensitivity 100%      45.45% 75%     100% 80.11%
Specificity      94.44%       100%  83.33%     84.21% 90.50%
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protocols devoted to exclude possible biases and 
alternative hypotheses. 
All the experiments confirm the presence of 
spikes in neurons under tested conditions of opti-
cal and electrical shielding. On the basis of the 
experimental findings and the bench tests, it is 
possible to state that the spikes appearing in the 
neural signals simultaneously with the electro-
magnetic pulses are not due to interference. 
The reactivity of neurons to the electromag-
netic pulses could be due to the presence of mi-
crotubules in their cellular structure. The microtu-
bules, formed by wrapped tubulin molecules, are 
structurally similar to carbon nanotubes. Actually, 
the structures are empty cylinders; the diameter 
of a microtubule is around 20 nm and its length is 
around some micron, whereas a carbon nanotube’s 
dimensions can be similar to or less than those 
of the microtubule. Interesting optical, electrical, 
and quantum properties of carbon nanotubes are 
known (Andrews & Bradshaw, 2005; Gao, Cagin, 
& Goddard, 1998; Katura, 1999; Lovett, Reina, 
Nazir, Kothari, & Briggs, 2003; Wang et al., 2005). 
It is also known that both microtubules and nano-
tubes behave as oscillators (Marx & Mandelkow, 
1994; Sept, Limbach, Bolterauer, & Tuszynski, 
1999), and this could make them superreactive 
receivers able to amplify the signal.
The reported experimental findings need 
further exploration and confirmation. Neverthe-
less, they constitute an attempt to investigate on 
possible quantum processes in the brain: Experi-
mental proofs are necessary to yield a validation 
of the quantum mind theories and to try to find an 
empirical solution of the mind-body problem.
FUtUrE trENDs
These preliminary results encourage us to con-
tinue our research with more and more complex 
experiments. As regards the research on possible 
quantum processes in neurons, many other ex-
periments will be needed that must be confirmed 
by analogous experiments carried out by other 
groups. On the other hand, several theoretical 
physicists and cognitive scientists are developing 
new theories on the ontological implications of 
quantum physics and in particular on the theme 
of the quantum mind.
As regards our experiments on learning in the 
bionic brain, better performance can be reached 
in the future with a better tuning of the artificial 
neural network that decodes the neural signals. 
During an off-line experiment, we already tested 
a new procedure able to reach better performance. 
In the future, it will be possible to test the system 
with a higher number of electrodes and endow it 
with sensors that allow real perceptions instead of 
the simulated ones. Our goal is to create a bionic 
creature that reacts autonomously to environmen-
tal stimulations, and to improve the complexity 
of its neural networks.
Only the growth in complexity of the system 
could give rise to nonstereotyped behaviors, and 
make possible new answers to the problem of 
the relationship between mind, brain, and ma-
chines. On the other side, several scientists are 
implementing complex software systems able to 
emulate functionalities of the human brain. Also 
in this case, only a sharp increase of complexity 
of these intelligent systems can yield some indica-
tions on the real possibility to simulate the most 
evolved features of the human mind. Currently, 
several intelligent systems are able to exhibit 
performance similar or better than human ones, 
but this performance does not concern the sphere 
of emotions and self-awareness, and they are only 
partially able to perceive and learn autonomously 
from the environment and to improve their abili-
ties over time.
Although the way toward the development 
of an artificial mind is still quite long, certainly 
AI is taking many important technological con-
tributions in all the fields of our lives, by means 
of software embedded in instrumentations and 
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computers, and of more and more evolved ro-
bots that facilitate many tasks in the past only 
pertinent to humans: from health to industry to 
domestic life.
In the particular case of our Living Networks 
Lab, we hope that the by-products of our research 
activity could be useful to deepen neurophysi-
ological knowledge, test the possibility of biologi-
cal computation, and develop bionic prostheses 
useful to people who suffer from neurological 
damage.
cONcLUsION
The success of the cognitive sciences, of AI, and 
of the neurosciences removed the problem of the 
nature of the mind and consciousness from the 
category of the philosophical problems and put it 
at the center of the attention of science.
The lack of ultimate answers on this issue is 
in part due to the poor complexity of the current 
artificial systems in comparison with the complex-
ity of the brain, making it impossible to compare 
artificial and human performance and features. 
Therefore, a huge amount of work is still to be 
done, but some important courses have been drawn 
out, both in the field of the development of the 
software simulation of intelligent behavior, and 
in the field of the development of bionic systems 
that reproduce the neurophysiological structure 
of the brain.
Also, theoretical physics has still to yield an 
ultimate answer on its fundamentals in order to 
clarify the role of the person in the objective re-
ality in such a way as to shed light on the nature 
of consciousness.
Despite the difficulty of the problems that 
neurosciences, informatics, and physics have to 
solve in this frame, the quantity of scientific ma-
terial related to the issue of consciousness and to 
the implementation of AI hardware and software 
systems has grown exponentially during the last 
few years. This trend will certainly contribute to 
consider the birth of a real artificial mind and the 
solution of the mystery of consciousness as not 
so far and not so impossible events.
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